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Introduction
In this paper, I investigate whether the effect of a rule on how to act in a social dilemma situation depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. Most importantly, my experimental design allows me to determine the drivers of the effect of democratic participation: self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via voting, or democracy per se. Since many interactions in real life related to cooperation are subject to non-deterrent policies, I focus on a rule which prescribes full contributions to a public good and is backed by a weak sanction for those who do not comply. For instance, in international environmental treaties between sovereign nations, like the Kyoto protocol, no third-party mechanism exists to enforce the agreement (e.g., Barett 2010) . Small scale common property goods, like fisheries, do have formal authorities in most cases, but authorities often lack the capacities to monitor, sanction and enforce (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007 ). Therefore, this experiment is in general related to the vast literature on how to design policies in order to foster cooperation in social dilemma situations in the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms. 1 However, not the policy itself but rather the process of how it is implemented is at the focus of my paper. Thus, I contribute to the growing economic literature which investigates whether the effect of a policy depends on how it is implemented. One of Elinor Ostrom's design principles characterising robust institutions for managing commonpool resources is that resource users affected by regulations should be authorized to participate in making and modifying the rules (Ostrom 1990) . Initially this refers to the importance of local knowledge in devising effective rules. Further -and most of all -positive aspects of participation have been identified in several field studies. Participation is suggested to increase the willingness to follow rules or to avoid that externally imposed regulations crowd out voluntary cooperative behavior (e.g., Ostrom and Nagendra 2006) . In this line, Bardhan (2000) shows that users of a common-pool resource tend to manage the resource more successfully when they are genuinely engaged in decisions on rules affecting their use. Further empirical findings by Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) and Frey (1998) , for example, suggest that income tax compliance in Switzerland increases with democratic participation. A central problem with the interpretation of theses studies is that unobservable confounding factors such as self-selection into policies could affect the results. A series of laboratory experiments aim at taking confounding factors into account in more controlled environments and suggest that the effect of democratic participation is rather nuanced. The majority of Introduction the experiments suggest a positive democracy premium, i.e., that institutions are more effective if they are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process than externally imposed (e.g., Ertan et al. 2009 , Sutter et al. 2010 , Dal Bó et al. 2010 ). However, other experiments provide a more differentiated and mixed picture. Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) , for instance, find that democratic participation in determining minimum contributions to a public good does not necessarily raise overall cooperation levels. Especially participants with relatively high obligations reduce contributions, if these are democratically determined. In a related experiment, Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004) show that cooperation collapses if groups democratically reject imposing minimum contribution levels. Tyran and Feld (2006) find that the effect of democratic participation can cut both ways. Based on a public goods game, they find that a simple contribution rule which aims at fostering cooperation is more effective in case it is endogenously chosen than the same rule externally imposed. If the rule is endogenously rejected, in contrast, the effect of participation tends to be negative. Drawing on the experiment by Tyran and Feld (2006) and using samples of students and workers in China, Vollan et al. (2017) conclude that the effectiveness of democratic participation depends on its conformity with societal values, norms, and rules. They find that participants cooperate on average the most if the contribution rule is exogenously imposed, what can be explained with a long history and great importance of authoritarian norms in China. One reason that prevents us from identifying a coherent effect based on these studies is that potential drivers of the effect democratic participation are not equally considered, identified and quantified. Dal Bó et al. (2010) suggest a randomization technique to identify and quantify different drivers of the effect of democratic participation. Based on a prisoner's dilemma they introduce the opportunity to democratically impose a deterrent sanction on mutual defection which transforms their dilemma into a coordination problem. After taking potential confounding factors into account, they conclude that the deterrent policy is more likely to be respected if it is democratically chosen than externally imposed. In this paper, I complement the existing literature by investigating whether democratic participation increases participants' compliance with a non-deterrent intervention. The democratic decision-making process is considerably simplified in my experiment. Following the experimental literature, participants have to vote for the introduction of an intervention. It is of fundamental importance to look at non-deterrent interventions since it provides the opportunity to study how participants follow rules although they face incentives not to do so and it remains unclear whether the findings by Dal Bó et al. (2010) can be extrapolated into a setting with a non-deterrent intervention. Based on the experimental design by Tyran and Feld (2006) , the rule in my experiment prescribes full contributions to the public good and a sanction for participants who do not comply with the obligation. The sanction is non-deterrent and zero contributions remain the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. Furthermore, my paper extends previous experiments by identifying and separating three potential drivers of the effect of democratic participation. Theory on procedural utility suggests that people do not only value outcomes but also the processes. It indicates that being aware of the fact that the group imposed the policy may directly affect agents' behavior (Frey and Stutzer 2005) . A second hypothesis is that democratic decision making could also affect behavior because it reveals information to agents on their partners' likelihood to favor a specific policy or not, affecting both the agents' beliefs about the partners' future behavior and thus their own behavior (Tyran and Feld 2006) . Finally, while groups are randomly formed, they are not necessarily identical. One cannot exclude the possibility that there are unobservable factors that explain both responses to policies and the policy selected (Dal Bó et al. 2010) . Adopting an identification strategy suggested by Dal Bó et al. (2010) , I control for self-selection and separate the total effect of a democratically chosen contribution rule into a selection, information and a democracy effect. Using a laboratory experiment, I observe that a simple contribution rule in a public goods game backed by a mild and non-deterrent sanction improves contributions under democracy, but not in case treatments are externally given. In line with Tyran and Feld (2006) , contributions to the public good are significantly higher if the contribution rule is endogenously chosen (through a democratic process) than if it is democratically rejected. However, after controlling for effects of self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by revealing the outcome of the referendum, democratic participation does not directly affect participants' contribution behavior anymore. My findings thus suggest that the effect of democratic participation does not per se increase participants' willingness to comply with rules which are for the common good, but at odds with their individual free-riding incentives. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design of the study. Results are presented in Section 3. A concluding discussion is provided in Section 4.
Experimental design
The experimental design is based on a linear public goods game with subjects randomly and anonymously matched into groups of three for the entire experiment. The experiment consists of two parts. In Part I, subjects participate in ten rounds of a stand-ard public goods game. Each subject i receives an initial endowment of e = 20 LabDollar (LD) in each round which has to be allocated to either a public good (q i ) or a private good (e − q i ). Subject i's payoff (π i ) is given by the private good plus the benefit from the group's contributions to the public good multiplied by the marginal per capita return of β = 0.5, i.e., π i = e − q i + 0.5 ∑ 3 j=1 q j . Since β < 1 < nβ, complete free-riding (q i = 0) is the unique dominant strategy for all subjects, according to the standard game theoretic prediction of purely selfish subjects. Full contributions to the public good (q i = 20) are, in contrast, socially optimal. After ten rounds of this standard public goods game, Part II of the experiment starts. In Part II, subjects play ten rounds as in Part I but they can impose a rule at the beginning of this part. The main focus of my experiment is to investigate whether and, if so, how the effect of the rule depends on the procedure of implementation. Therefore, I decided to keep the rule as simple and non-strategic as possible and abstain from introducing rather complex centralized (e.g., Cardenas et al. 2000) or decentralized sanctioning mechanisms (e.g., Carpenter 2007) . Following Tyran and Feld (2006) the rule aims at fostering cooperation by prescribing full contributions to the public good backed by a fixed and automatically imposed sanction of s = 4 for subjects who do not comply, i.e., q i < 20. In case the rule is imposed, subject i's payoff is given by:
With s = 4 the penalty for violating the proposed contribution is rather low and zero contributions to the public good remain the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. Since β = 0.5, partial contribution is never optimal. Complete freeriding yields a payoff of
Compliance is rational if and only if
. This would require a sanction of s > 10. However, s = 4 and, therefore, full free-riding is the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies, i.e., π i ( Tyran and Feld (2006) vote in a referendum on whether or not to enact the rule. However, Tyran and Feld (2006) do not explicitly control for confounding factors like self-selection and information transmitted by voting. Using a within-subject design, Tyran and Feld (2006) rely on the strategy method, in which subjects make contingent decisions for all possible outcomes of the referendum. According to standard game theoretic predictions, the strategy method should yield the same decisions as the direct-response method. However, the literature suggests that subjects make different decisions in contingent responses relative to situations where they face given and known decisions (e.g., Falk et al. 2005; Brandts and Charness 2011; Jordan et al. 2016) . In this experiment, I rely on a direct-response design and adopt a randomization technique suggested by Dal Bó et al. (2010) to control for self-selection of treatments and to disentangle the effect of a democratically chosen contribution rule. Dal Bó et al. (2010) use a prisoner's dilemma with mutual defection as unique Nash equilibrium and introduce the opportunity to impose a sanction on unilateral defection. The sanction is comparatively strong and both mutual defection and cooperation are Nash equilibria. I investigate the effect of a rather weak and non-deterrent rule. This is of fundamental importance because strong and deterrent rules set strong incentives, thus cooperation and compliance seem easier anyway. Furthermore, many situations in real life, and especially in an environmental policy context, are subject to rather non-deterrent interventions. Either no supra authorities exist in order to monitor, enforce, and sanction any policy, or, in case authorities exist, they lack the resources to enforce policies. I complement the existing literature by combining the experiments by Tyran and Feld (2006) and Dal Bó et al. (2010) in order to test whether the effect of a weak and nondeterrent contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it has been implemented. The corresponding randomization strategy is summarized in Figure 1 . First, all three participants per group vote simultaneously and anonymously in a referendum on whether to enact the rule or not. Second, the computer randomly chooses whether to consider the votes in each group. If the computer considers the votes, the majority wins. If the computer does not consider the votes, it randomly chooses whether or not to reveal the information regarding the outcome of the referendum and, in a second step, whether or not to impose the rule exogenously. After the voting stage, subjects are informed whether the computer randomly chose to consider votes and whether the rule is implemented. 2 In case participants do receive the information about the outcome of the voting stage, they do not learn the exact distribution of votes. They learn whether at least two subjects or at the most one subject per group voted for the rule.
The eight possible treatments are denoted as EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, ExoMinRule, ExoMajNoRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule. Endo denotes that the votes of the group were considered and Exo denotes that the computer overrode the votes. Rule denotes that the rule is implemented versus NoRule. In case the information regarding the outcome of the referendum is available, Maj denotes that the majority of the group supported the rule, Min denotes that only a minority supported the rule. Ni denotes that this information is not available. 3 After Part II has been completed, agents fill in a final questionnaire on socio demographic characteristics as well as attitudes and values adapted from established value surveys (World Value Survey 2014). I included questions to measure participants' trust Results level, locus of control, political preferences and political commitments as well as their acceptance of authorities.
Results
The experiment was conducted at the mLab of the University of Mannheim, Germany. I used the experimental software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007) for programming, and participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) . I conducted 17 sessions between October 2016 and June 2017 with a total of 270 participants. 4 A session lasted on average slightly more than 60 minutes and participants earned on average 11.60 euros, with a maximum of 18.00 euros and a minimum of 5.00 euros. Average contributions to the public good over rounds and across treatments in both parts of the experiment are summarized in Figure 2 . In the first part of the experiment, both the level of contributions to the public good as well as the pattern are comparable to other voluntary contribution mechanisms (e.g., Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2011 ). In Part I, participants contribute on average 6.99 LD to the public good and contributions decrease over rounds with an average of 10.40 LD in round 1 and 3.63 LD in round 10. Although all participants played a standard voluntary contribution mechanism without any interventions in the first ten rounds, there are differences across treatments in terms of participants' contributions, especially at the end of Part I. According to a Kruskal-Wallis test, contributions cannot be considered as equal across treatments in the last five (p-value 0.066) and three (p-value 0.040) rounds of the first part of the experiment. More precisely, in round 10 participants in ExoNiNoRule contribute on average 1.25 LD to the public good and therefore significantly less than participants in the other treatments. 5 Therefore, even before the voting stage and the assignment to treatments, participants can not be considered statistically identical in terms of contribution levels.
In line with previous evidence on the restart effect in prisoner's dilemma games (e.g., Andreoni and Miller 1993) and public goods games (e.g., Andreoni 1988), contributions increase at the beginning of the second part of the experiment (see Figure 2 ). The increase is much larger in case the rule is implemented, which leads to substantial differences across treatments in Part II (p-value: 0.000, Kruskal-Wallis test) and especially in round 11 (p-value: 0.000, Kruskal-Wallis test). 6 In order to estimate and disentangle 4 Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the number of participants by treatment and vote. The two treatments ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule are irrelevant for my analysis, therefore the results are based on the 213 participants in the treatments of primary interest, i.e., EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule. 5 Differences are also robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing proposed by List et al. (2016) . 6 In Part II of the experiment, the differences are also robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis Depending on individual votes and the randomization strategy described in Section 2 participants are assigned to treatments in Part II. EndoRule (EndoNoRule): contribution rule is democratically chosen (rejected). ExoMajRule (ExoMinNoRule): contribution rule is externally imposed (not imposed) and participants receive the information that the majority (minority) of their group supported the rule. ExoRule (ExoNoRule): contribution rule is externally imposed (not imposed).
the effect of democratic participation, I follow Dal Bó et al. (2010) and initially focus on behavior in the first round of Part II, i.e., round 11. Since participants can not be considered statistically identical in terms of cooperation levels in the first part of the experiment, I use individual differences in contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and round 10 (i.e., the last round of Part I) as primary outcome variable.
Results from the voting stage
Right after Part I of the experiment has been completed, participants vote in a referendum on whether to enact the rule or not. The vast majority of the 270 participants wanted the rule to be introduced. More precisely, significantly more participants vote testing (List et al. 2016 The approximately 73% of participants voting for the rule are clearly above the 50% obtained by Tyran and Feld (2006) and 53% by Dal Bó et al. (2010) . However, the intervention of Dal Bó et al. (2010) differs substantially from the rule used by Tyran and Feld (2006) and in this experiment. The intervention by Dal Bó et al. (2010) is comparatively strong and affects the equilibrium of their game, this could explain the comparatively low level of support. 7 I use the same contribution rule as Tyran and Feld (2006) , however, the experiments differ in their protocols. In the experiment by Tyran and Feld (2006) participants do not interact before they vote on whether or not to impose the contribution rule. In my experiment, in contrast, participants play ten rounds of a standard public goods game before they vote. The experience they have made in Part I and the enhanced understanding of the experiment could drive the differences in voting behavior. I define the variable Yes, which is a binary variable for whether participants vote in favor of the rule or not, in order to analyze participants voting behavior in more detail via estimating a regression model (see Table 1 ). In line with Dal Bó et al. (2010) my results suggest that participants own contributions to the public good in Part I of the experiment (Coop. Part I: Own) are positively and significantly correlated with voting for the rule. More cooperative participants are more likely to vote for enacting the rule. In this line, voting for the rule is negatively correlated with the average contributions of the other group members in Part I (Coop. Part I: Others). However, the effect does not reach the conventional significant levels. In addition, my findings suggest that participants who are convinced to be able to control events that affect their lives (Locus of control) are more likely to vote for the rule. Furthermore, males are more likely to favor the rule compared to females (Female). Finally, I find that that participants' political commitment (Pol. commitment) affects participants' voting behavior significantly. Participants reporting a strong political commitment vote significantly less frequently for enacting the rule than participants with a weak commitment.
Endogenous vs. exogenous treatments effects: Aggregated analysis
The main results of Part II of the experiment are summarized in See Section 2 for a detailed discussion of the differences in interventions. Note: Probit regression. Coefficients (average marginal effects) with robust standard errors in parentheses in column 1 (2). Dependent variable (Yes): 1 if participant votes for rule and 0 otherwise. Coop. Part I: Own (Others): average own contributions (contributions of others) in Part I. Trust: index for stated trust level between 0 (low) and 1 (high). Locus of control stated locus of control on a scale between 1 and 10: 1 high external locus of control, 10 high internal locus of control. Obey authority: index for stated respect for authorities between 0 (high) and 1 (low). Democrat: stated importance of living in a democratic system on a scale between 1 and 10: 1 not important at all, 10 very important. Pol. commitment: index for stated political commitment between 0 (low) and 1 (high). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Results
Results ment effects shown in Panel B are estimated by the differences in individual contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part II). 8 To start the aggregated analysis I derive the total treatment effect (TotalTrE) of the democratically chosen rule by comparing the treatment effect in case the rule is democratically chosen (EndoRule) with the effect if it is democratically rejected (EndoNoRule). By randomly assigning participants to treatments and conditioning on individual votes, I can decompose this TotalTrE into four components: the exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE), the effect of revealing the information about the outcome of the referendum (In f oE), the effect of self-selection into treatments (SelE), and the effect of democratic participation (DemoE). Results of the decomposition are shown in Figure 3 . In order to structure the analysis, I extend a framework by Dal Bó et al. (2010) by explicitly addressing the effect of information transmitted via the results of the referendum. In this sense, I denote as g(υ|M, I, R) the proportion of subjects who vote υ ∈ {Y, N} (in favor or against the rule) given the procedure of implementation M ∈ {Endo, Exo} (democratically chosen or randomly by the computer), the information available of the outcome of the voting stage I ∈ {Maj, Min, Ni} (majority or minority support the rule or no information available), structure of the experiment R ∈ {Rule, NoRule} (rule imposed or not), and let q(υ|M, I, R) be the difference between contributions in round 11 and round 10 of participants who voted υ given the structure of the experiment, the amount of information available, and the procedure of implementation.
Total Treatment Effect -The first two columns in Panel B of This shows that participants contribute on average 9.44 LD more to the public good in case the rule is democratically chosen than democratically rejected. 10 This first obser-8 The two treatments ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule are not required to estimate and disentangle the effect of democracy and therefore not considered in Table 2 . A summary of all individual contributions in Part I and Part II of the experiment is given in vation can be summarized by establishing the following result:
Result 2: Contributions are higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if it is democratically rejected.
In case both treatments are exogenously imposed and participants do not receive the information about the outcome of the referendum, the rule does not significantly increase contribution levels (ExoNiRule: 10.43 vs. ExoNiNoRule: 8.21, p-value: 0.357, Table 3 -column 1). Moreover, by simply comparing these two effects I can replicate the finding by Tyran and Feld (2006) that the effect of the rule is stronger under democracy than if treatments are exogenously given (9.44 vs. 2.22, p-value: 0.024). 11 However, the TotalTrE captures at least two changes. A change in treatments (EndoRule vs. EndoNoRule) and, by design, a change in the proportion of yes-and no-voters across treatments. Furthermore, under democracy participants do know the outcome of the referendum. This is not the case if treatments are exogenously given and could also affect their behavior. Before we take potential effects of self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted via voting into account the naive comparison Note: Estimated total treatment effect (TotalTrE), endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE), information treatment effect (In f oTrE), and exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE). Confidence intervals at the 90%-level. The information effect (In f oE) is given by the difference between In f oTrE and ExoTrE. The selection effect (SelE) is given by the TotalTrE and the difference between EndoTrE. The democracy effect (DemoE) is given by the difference between EndoTrE and In f oTrE.
between endogenously and exogenously implemented treatments could be biased. By conditioning on the proportion of yes-and no-voters or the contributions per treatment, I can separate the TotalTrE into an endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE) and a selection effect (SelE).
Endogenous Treatment Effect -The EndoTrE leaves the proportion of yes-and no-voters constant and captures only the endogenous change in the structure of the experiment.
In other words, it measures the effect of changing treatments democratically assuming that the proportion of yes-and no-voters is the same in both treatments. With 7.47 LD the effect loses some of its strength, but contributions are still significantly higher in case the rule is democratically chosen than if it is rejected (p-value: 0.006). 12 That the EndoTrE is de facto slightly below the TotalTrE indicates a weak and positive effect of self-selection into treatments under democracy.
Selection Effect -The SelE is given by the difference between the TotalTrE and the 

EndoTrE. It captures the effect of the change in the proportion of yes-and no-voters in
EndoRule and EndoNoRule leaving the contributions constant across treatments.
[g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule) − g(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)]q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule).
The effect of self-selection is given by 1.97 LD. 13 In line with Dal Bó et al. (2010) this indicates that yes-voters show the tendency to contribute more to the public good than no-voters across treatments. However, the selection effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value: 0.282).
Exogenous Treatment Effect -The ExoTrE captures the change in contributions to the public good due to an exogenous change in treatments in case participants do not receive any information about the outcome of the voting stage. As in the endogenous treatment effect, it leaves the proportion of yes-and no-voters constant across treatments in order to take the effect of self-selection into account.
According to Table 2 , the ExoTrE is given by 3.01 LD and statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value: 0.253). 14 In case treatments are exogenously given, the rule does not affect participants' contribution behavior. In line with Tyran and Feld (2006) , this leads to the following result:
Result 3: In case treatments are exogenously imposed, the rule does not increase contributions.
Information Treatment Effect -Analogous to the ExoTrE the information treatment effect (In f oTrE) captures the change in contributions due to an exogenous change in treatments and leaves the proportion of yes-and no-voters constant. In addition, the information about the outcome of the voting stage is revealed.
In f oTrE = ∑ Table 2 , I can calculate this effect as 7.04 LD. 15 In case treatments are exogenously given and the information about the outcome of the referendum is revealed the rule does significantly affect participants' contribution behavior (p-value: 0.002).
Results
According to
Information Effect -In order to isolate the effect of the information transmitted by the voting stage, I use the difference between the information treatment effect (In f oTrE) and the exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE). Therefore, the information effect (In f oE) leaves the proportion of yes-and no-voters, the treatments and how they have been imposed constant and only captures the effect of revealing the outcome of the voting stage.
It is given by 4.03 LD, but the difference is statistically not different from zero (p-value: 0.239). 16
Democracy Effect -Finally, the democracy effect (DemoE) captures the effect of choosing treatments democratically. It is measured by the difference between the endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE) and the information treatment effect (In f oTrE). It leaves the proportion of yes-and no-voters, the information available and respective treatments constant. Only the procedure how treatments have been implemented changes.
The DemoE is given by 0.43 LD and indicates that democratic participation does not affect contributions directly (p-value: 0.900). 17 This leads to the following result:
Result 4: After controlling for self-selection into treatments and information transmitted via voting, democratic participation does not affect contributions.
Decomposition -Having calculated all the different effects, I can decompose the total treatment effect of 9.44 LD into four components. It can be rewritten as TotalTrE = ExoTrE + In f oE + SelE + DemoE. The TotalTrE is given by the effect of the rule if
Results treatments are exogenously imposed (ExoTrE = 3.01), the effect of revealing the outcome of the referendum (In f oE = 4.03), the effect of self-selection into treatments under democracy (SelE = 1.97), and, finally, the effect of democratic participation itself (DemoE = 0.43). The decomposition shows that the effect of democratic participation is not statistically significant and is also rather low in also rather low in magnitude. My results suggest that the democratic participation explains only 5% of the total treatment effect. The absence of a direct effect of democratic participation is robust to restricting the analysis to contributions in the first round of Part II of the experiment (round 11) or expanding the analysis to average contributions in all ten rounds of the second part. 18 By considering only the average contributions in the first round of Part II, contributions to the public good are on average significantly higher in case the rule is democratically chosen than if it is democratically rejected (16.00 vs. 8.05, p-value: 0.000) and the TotalTrE is given by 7.95 LD. The TotalTrE consists of the effect of the exogenously imposed treatments (ExoTrE = 6.47, p-value: 0.007), the information effect (In f oE = 0.997, p-value: 0.818), the effect of self-selection into treatments (SelE = 0.929, p-value: 0.649), and the direct effect of democratic participation (DemoE = −0.446, p-value: 0.921). By expanding the analysis to all ten rounds of Part II of the experiment, the TotalTrE amounts to 6.85 LD (p-value: 0.001). This effect can be decomposed into a ExoTrE of 7.56 LD (p-value: 0.005), a In f oE of -1.15 LD (p-value: 0.799), a SelE of 0.33 LD (p-value: 0.040), and a DemoE of 0.109 LD (p-value: 0.979). In case the analysis is restricted to contributions in round 11 or expanded to the average of contributions in all ten rounds of Part II, I find that the rule increases contributions significantly even in case treatments are exogenously given. Furthermore, when giving participants time to learn and coordinate, the effect of self-selection into treatments becomes more important and statistically significant.
Endogenous vs. exogenous treatments effects: Individual level analysis
When I control for self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted via the outcome of the election, the aggregated analysis in Section 3.2 shows that democratic participation does not affect participants' contribution behavior. However, the effect may vary across individual types of participants, especially yes-and no-voters. To take individual differences into account, I estimate a series of linear regression models for the complete sample as well as separately for yes-and no-voters. Table 3 con-Results tains the results. I use simple OLS regressions. Dependent variables are the individual differences in contributions between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part I) (first three columns of Table 3 ) and the average contributions in Part II of the experiment (last three columns of Table 3 ). All regressions are estimated without a constant and indicator variables for the different treatments to compare outcomes across the procedure of implementation (Endo vs. Exo), the information available (Maj vs. Min vs. Ni) and the structure of the experiment (NoRule vs. Rule). The difficulty is that participants in groups that choose or reject the rule democratically may be different from those participants in exogenously imposed treatments. I can derive unbiased estimates by conditioning on participants' votes. Furthermore, I can disentangle the effect of democratic participation by conditioning on the information available and the structure of the experiment. More precisely, I can estimate the information effect by comparing contributions under externally imposed treatments with treatments under exogenously imposed treatments where the outcome of the election is revealed, i.e., ExoNiRule vs. ExoMajRule if the rule is implemented and ExoNiNoRule vs. ExoMinNoRule if it is not imposed. Following this logic, I estimate the democracy effect by comparing contributions in case the rule is democratically chosen or rejected with contributions in case treatments are externally imposed and the information about the referendum are available, i.e., ExoMajRule vs. EndoRule if the rule is implemented and ExoMinNoRule vs. EndoNoRule if it is not.
Among participants who voted in favor of the rule, i.e., yes-voters, there is no evidence that the information transmitted via voting affect participants' contribution levels. Yesvoters contribute 12.62 LD if the rule is exogenously given and 12.55 LD if it is exogenously imposed and, in addition, the information about the outcome of the election is revealed (p-value: 0.985, Table 3 -column 2). I also do not find evidence for an information effect in case the rule is not imposed (8.88 vs. 3.67, p-value: 0.310, Table 3 column 2). Furthermore, I do not find an effect of democratic participation among yesvoters. Neither in case the rule is implemented (12.67 vs. 12.55, p-value: 0.962, Table  3 -column 2 ) nor in case it is not implemented (8.88 vs. 5.43, p-value: 0.560, Table 3 -column 2). This supports Result 4 that democracy does not affect contributions after controlling for self-selection and taking the information effect into account. For no-voters, there is also no evidence for an information effect. Revealing the outcome of the election does not effect participants' contributions neither when the rule is externally imposed (5.54 vs. -0.5, p-value: 0.251, Table 3 -column 3) nor when it is not (6.17 vs. 1.67, p-value: 0.310, Table 3 -column 3). In case the rule is not imposed, there is no effect of participation (1.67 vs. 1.50, p-value: 0891, Table 3 -column 3). The Note: OLS regressions. Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10 are the dependent variable in the first three columns. In the second three columns, average contributions in all ten rounds of Part II are the dependent variable. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the group level. All regressions are done for the complete sample (All) as well as for yes-voters (Yes-voters) and no-voters (no-voters) separately. The independent variables are indicator variables for the different treatments. p-values correspond to Wald tests on the regression results. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Results
effect of participation is, in contrast, positive and statistically significant if the rule is implemented. More precisely, the difference in contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part I) is -0.5 LD if the rule is externally imposed and participants receive the information about the outcome of the referendum. In case the rule is democratically chosen, this difference amounts to 10.14 LD. This shows a positive democracy premium among no-voters if the rule is imposed (p-value: 0.000, Table 3 -column 3). However, this effect is not strong enough to drive aggregate results.
Summary and concluding remarks
This experiment contributes to the literature by investigating if, how, and why democratic participation increases participants' willingness to comply with a non-deterrent rule which aims at fostering cooperation. My experimental design enables me to identify and separate potential drivers of the effect of democratic participation. I can determine to what extent the effect is driven by self-selection into the rule, information transmitted by voting, and democracy per se. Tyran and Feld (2006) report that a non-deterrent contribution rule is more effective if it is endogenously chosen by voting than externally imposed. However, they do not explicitly take effects of self-selection and information transmitted via voting into account. Focusing on a deterrent intervention which transforms their prisoner's dilemma into a coordination problem, Dal Bó et al.
(2010) suggest a randomization strategy to derive an unbiased estimate of the effect of democratic participation. I complement the existing literature by combining the key elements of Tyran and Feld (2006) and Dal Bó et al. (2010) experiments to test whether the effect of a non-deterrent contribution rule depends on whether is has been endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process or externally imposed and, if so, to what extent this is driven by self-selection into treatments, the information transmitted via voting, and democratic participation per se. Investigating a nondeterrent contribution rule enables me to investigate the willingness of participants to follow a rule which is for the common good, but at odds with their individual freeriding incentives. This is a central characteristic of many interactions in real life social dilemmas which are subject to non-deterrent policies which do not affect underlying incentive schemes. In an environmental policy context, for instance, either no supranational authorities exist in order to enforce international environmental policies (e.g., Barett 2010), or, in case authorities exist at the local level, they lack capacities and resources to actually enforce policies (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007 ). Furthermore, deterrent rules set strong incentives and, thus, there is no conflict between cooperation and compliance what increases participants' willingness to follow the rule. In line with the existing literature, I find that contributions to the public good are significantly higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if it is democratically rejected. In case treatments are exogenously given, in contrast, the contribution rule does not affect participants' contribution behavior. A naive comparison would suggest that the contribution rule is more effective in fostering contributions to the public good in case treatments are endogenously chosen than in case treatments are externally given. However, this comparison neglects potential confounding factors and does not necessarily prove that democratic participation increases participants' willingness to comply with a non-deterrent contribution rule. More precisely, my decomposition reveals that the apparently different effects are not directly driven by democratic participation per se. Democratic participation does not affect participants' contribution behavior if I take self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted by revealing the outcome of the referendum into account. Of course, it is very difficult to make direct generalizations from my experiment, not at least because of the fact that I study students' behavior in an environment where they know they are being observed which might lead to higher willingness to follow the rule. Furthermore, due to my randomization strategy and the high amount of participants supporting the rule, participants are distributed unequally across treatments. It becomes thus more difficult to provide evidence for a statistically significant effect of democratic participation in my experiment. However, my findings not only indicate that democratic participation does not directly and significantly affect participants' compliance with a non-deterrent contribution rule, it is also shown that democratic participation explains only about 5% of the overall treatment effect. Therefore, the effect of participation appears to be neither of statistical nor economic significance. This is not necessarily a contradiction to the postulate that democratic participation actually affects behavior. My findings rather show that the effect of choosing a nondeterrent intervention which aims at fostering cooperation in a social dilemma situation is a conglomerate of different sub-effects of participation. Differences with the existing literature suggest that the effect of participation depends on the type of the intervention. While Dal Bó et al. (2010) find a positive democracy premium in case of a deterrent contribution rule, my experiment does not provide evidence that people are more willing to follow a weak and non-deterrent rule if it is democratically chosen than externally given. This suggests that democratic participation can motivate people to comply with rules which are in their own interest, but not necessarily with rules which are at odds with their individual free-riding incentives. Finally, in order to decrease complexity, I follow the existing experimental literature and reduce the process of democratic decision-making to voting. Thereby, the experimental design obviously neglects further important aspects of democratic participation like, for instance, communication, deliberation, and different decision rules. It is not the purpose of this paper to capture democratic decision-making in all this facets, but this could be a an interesting and important route for further research.
Instructions [Translated from German] †
Welcome!
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants and turn off all electronic devices such as phones for the whole course of this session. Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any questions. This experiment regards individual decision behaviour. At the end of the experiment, you will receive an individual payment anonymously and in cash. Your payment will be based on the decisions you and your fellow participants will have taken as well as a random component. During the experiment, your payment will be calculated in so-called LaborDollar (LD). After the experiment, the total sum of LD will be converted into euros. The exchange rate is:
2 LD = 1 euro.
During the experiment, you will take your decisions anonymously. Only the experimenter will know about your identity. Of course, all provided information will be treated in strict confidence.
Rules of the experiment
The experiment consists of two parts (Part I and Part II). For the whole course of the experiment, all participants are divided into groups of three. The group constellations do not change and every participant inside their respective group will face the same decision scenarios.
Part I
In Part I, we will ask you and your fellow participants to take decisions in ten separate rounds. At the beginning of each round, you and your fellow group members will be endowed with 20 LD, respectively. You (as well as your fellow group members) will then have to decide on the amount of LD that you wish to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, can be between be 0 and 20 LD. Part I consists of ten separate rounds. In each round, you will face the same decision task and interact with the same two group members. After each decision, you will be informed on the average values as well as the contributions and payments regarding the other two group members. At the beginning, there will be two test rounds. They are not relevant for disbursement.
Part II
As in Part I, we will ask you and your fellow participants to take decisions in ten separate rounds. You will be part of the same group, which remains unchanged in its constellation. Again, at the beginning of each round, you and your fellow group members will be endowed with 20 LD, respectively. The decision tasks are the same as in Part I. You (as well as your fellow group members) will have to decide on the amount of LD that you wish to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, can be between be 0 and 20 LD. Whether the rule is introduced or not depends on the following: Firstly, the group decides on introduction of the rule by majority vote. Secondly, it is decided at random, whether the group's decision will be taken into account. After the voting, you will be informed on whether the group's decision will be taken into consideration.
• If the group's decision is taken into account, you will be informed on the voting results. The decision will be taken based on the group's majority. For example, if two out of the three group members vote in favour of the rule, it will be introduced. If only one group member is in favour, the rule will not be introduced.
• If the group's decision is not taken into account, the decision on introducing the contribution rule will be taken at random. Furthermore, it is decided at random, whether you will be informed about the voting results.
